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ABSTRACT
For the design of distributed work systems like P2P file-
sharing networks it is essential to provide incentives for
agents to work for each other rather than free ride. Sev-
eral mechanisms have been proposed to achieve this goal,
including currency systems, credit networks, and accounting
mechanisms. It has proven particularly challenging to pro-
vide robustness to sybil attacks, i.e., attacks where an agent
creates and controls multiple false identities. In this paper,
we consider accounting mechanisms for domains in which (1)
transactions cannot be bound to reports, (2) transactions
are bilateral and private, and (3) agents can only form trust
links upon successful work interactions. Our results reveal
the trade-off one must make in designing such mechanisms.
We show that accounting mechanisms with a strong form
of transitive trust cannot be robust against strongly bene-
ficial sybil attacks. However, we also present a mechanism
that strikes a balance, providing a weaker form of transi-
tive trust while also being robust against the strongest form
of sybil attacks. On the one hand, our results highlight the
role of strong social ties in providing robustness against sybil
attacks (such as those leveraged in credit networks using bi-
lateral IOUs), and on the other hand our results show what
kind of robustness properties are possible and impossible in
domains where such pre-existing trust relations do not exist.
Categories and Subject Descriptors
J.4 [Computer Applications]: Social and Behavioral Sci-
ences—Economics
Keywords
Sybil-proofness; Transitive Trust; Peer-to-Peer; Mechanism
Design; Credit Networks
1. INTRODUCTION
Distributed work systems arise in many places, for example
in peer-to-peer file-sharing networks, in decentralized ride-
sharing systems, and in ad hoc wireless networks where in-
dividual peers route data packages for each other. A central
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goal in such systems is to enable useful transactions between
agents, while providing incentives for them to perform work
rather than free-ride. A common theme is finding ways to
avoid the double coincidence of wants problem: it is almost
never the case that two agents can both provide useful work
for each other and are at the same time interested in the
work provided by each other. Rather, it is desirable to al-
low one agent to work for another agent now, receiving work
from the same or some other agent at a later point in time.
However, allowing such temporally disconnected, one-
sided work interactions can lead to an incentive problem in
the absence of trust: strategic agents may consume work
from others, but never reciprocate. Even systems with a
globally trusted currency, including micro payment systems
and virtual currencies like BitCoin [16], can suffer from free-
riding in the absence of the ability to bind a payment to
a work transaction. In particular, the party that acts first
must trust the other party to cooperate later.
1.1 Transitive Trust and Sybil-Proofness
Thus, trust is important to enable economic transactions.
However, requiring direct trust links for all transactions is
very limiting because in many domains, two agents may
want to interact that have never met before. In such situa-
tions, intermediaries can help if we allow for transitive trust :
if agent A trusts B and B trusts C, then A could decide to
also trust C, at least to some degree. This notion of transitive
trust is very natural in many domains, e.g., employees rec-
ommending new employees or doctors recommending other
doctors. In large networks, where the rendezvous-probability
of two agents is small, transitive trust is essential, increas-
ing the efficiency of the system by enabling many valuable
transactions.
Intuitively, allowing for transitive trust opens up more
possibilities for sybil attacks, where an agent creates and
controls multiple false identities. For example, a trusted
agent might claim that its sybils are trustworthy and then let
the sybils consume work for free. Given this, and in light of
the numerous impossibility results that have long plagued
approaches to achieve false-name-proofness in mechanism
design [5], it might seem hopeless to design sybil-proof ac-
counting schemes with transitive trust. However, experience
from the design of reputation systems and credit networks
has shown that, in certain settings and under certain as-
sumptions, sybil-proof mechanisms do exist. Nevertheless,
for accounting mechanisms with transitive trust, this has
been an open question for a long time, with particular in-
terest to the multi-agent systems community. For example,
the designers of Tribler [14], a P2P file-sharing client that
uses transitive trust, have already tried to design sybil-proof
accounting mechanisms as early as 2007. Our paper now re-
veals the difficulty of this problem: simultaneously satisfying
strong transitive trust and strong sybil-proofness is impos-
sible, and we show where trade-offs must be made.
1.2 Problem Set-Up
We consider a distributed work system of n agents, each
capable of doing work for each other. All agents provide the
same quality of work, quantifiable in the same units. Per-
forming work is costly and thus, all else equal, agents prefer
to free ride rather than work. Work interactions are bilateral
and private, i.e., no outside agent can observe or monitor an
interaction. There are no binding contracts, and work and
“payments” for work cannot be made simultaneously.
Periodically, each agent receives requests from some set of
agents for a work contribution. Agents have no a priori pref-
erence in working for one agent over another. In particular,
there are no pre-existing trust relationships between agents;
trust links are only formed after one agent performs work
for another. A direct trust link of weight w from A to B only
means that in the future, A will give preferential treatment
to B over other agents with scores less than w. If an agent
has no trust links yet, it performs work for a random agent
requesting work. An alternative way of bootstrapping the
trust links is via simultaneous exchanges of small pieces of
work (e.g., sharing file fragments in BitTorrent).
We assume a trusted center, and at any time, agents can
make voluntary (and perhaps untruthful) reports to the cen-
ter about work contributed and consumed in transactions
involving themselves. Yet, there is no way to bind a report
to the work contribution itself. At any time, an agent can
query the center for all reports that have been made by all
agents. Each agent has a unique identity, but for a tiny cost
ε > 0, an agent can generate sybils.1
In our own prior work [21], we have formalized accounting
mechanisms, which tally work performed and consumed, and
compute a score that approximates an agent’s net contribu-
tions. For this paper, we also use this accounting mechanism
framework.
1.3 Overview of Results
The focus of this paper is a theoretical inquiry into the
design of sybil-proof accounting mechanisms with transitive
trust. We introduce a set of natural properties, and show
which combinations of properties lead to impossibility re-
sults, and which combinations are possible. Our analysis re-
veals the necessary trade-off one must make between differ-
ent notions of transitive trust and sybil-proofness in design-
ing accounting mechanisms. Informally stated, and under
some natural assumptions, our main results are as follows:
1. Every accounting mechanism that satisfies strong tran-
sitive trust is vulnerable to strongly beneficial sybil
attacks.
1In practice, sybils are generally costly to produce, for ex-
ample because their creation involves solving CAPTCHAS
to create new accounts, or because it requires the acquisition
of multiple IP addresses. If the cost for creating sybils were
zero, an agent could create an infinite number of sybils and
exploit the bootstrapping process by consuming tiny pieces
of work and then disappearing.
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Figure 1: A subjective work graph from agent i’s
perspective. Edges where i has direct information
only have one weight. Other edges can have two
weights, corresponding to the possibly conflicting re-
ports of the two agents involved.
2. If we relax this to a weaker form of transitive trust,
then there exists an accounting mechanism that is ro-
bust to the strong kinds of sybil attacks.
3. However, as long as we require even a weak form of
transitive trust, every accounting mechanism is still
vulnerable to a weak kind of sybil attack.
By showing which properties of accounting mechanisms
are inherently incompatible, we provide guidance for future
research to focus on the optimal trade-off between different
properties.
2. FORMAL MODEL
The work performed by all agents in the distributed work
system is captured by a work graph:
Definition 1. (Work Graph) A work graph G =
(V,E,w) has vertices V = {1, . . . , n}, one for each agent,
and directed edges (i, j) ∈ E, for i, j ∈ V , corresponding to
work performed by i for j, with weight w(i, j) ∈ R≥0 denot-
ing the number of units of work.
We use e ∈ E when referring to a generic edge, and (i, j) ∈ E
when referring to the specific edge from i to j. The true work
graph may be unknown to the agents who only have direct
information about their own participation:
Definition 2. (Agent Information) Each agent i ∈ V
keeps a private history (wi(i, j), wi(j, i)) of its interactions
with other agents j ∈ V , where wi(i, j) and wi(j, i) are the
work performed for j and received from j respectively.
Based on its own experiences and reports from others, agent
i can construct a subjective work graph (see Figure 1). Let
wji (j, k), w
k
i (j, k) ∈ R≥0 denote the edge weight, as reported
by agent j and agent k respectively.
Definition 3. (Subjective Work) A subjective work
graph from agent i’s perspective, Gi = (Vi, Ei, wi), is a set of
vertices Vi ⊆ V and directed edges Ei. Each edge (j, k) ∈ Ei
for which i /∈ {j, k}, is labeled with one, or both, of weights
wji (j, k), w
k
i (j, k) as known to i. For edges (i, j) and (j, i) the
associated weight is wii(i, j) = w(i, j) and w
i
i(j, i) = w(j, i)
respectively.
We assume that the weights w are shared through voluntary
reports to a central server, while still maintaining the core
assumption of no central monitoring and no independent
verification of reports. Thus, the edge weights wji (j, k) and
wki (j, k) need not be truthful reports about w(j, k). The as-
sumption that the center cannot verify reports is motivated
in two ways: first, some P2P systems (like Tribler) are server-
less, such that “verification” is impossible. Second, even if a
server were used, it could receive conflicting reports from
two agents, and we are not aware of any mechanism that
could determine which agent is lying.
Periodically, an agent can receive a work request by a set
of agents, which induces a choice set:
Definition 4. (Choice Set) We let Ci ⊆ V \{i} denote
the choice set for agent i, i.e., the set of agents that are
currently interested in receiving some work from i.
An accounting mechanism computes a score for each j in
choice set Ci, given the information contained in the subjec-
tive work graph.
Definition 5. (Accounting Mechanism) Accounting
mechanism M takes as input a subjective work graph Gi,
a choice set Ci, and determines the score S
M
j (Gi, Ci) ∈ R,
for any agent j ∈ Ci, as viewed by agent i.
Throughout this paper we assume that the center runs the
accounting mechanism and computes the scores. Neverthe-
less, the computation still uses each agent’s subjective work
graph to compute the corresponding scores.
We now introduce two natural assumptions that all ac-
counting mechanisms must satisfy, and which will be essen-
tial for our impossibility results. First, we require that the
scores do not depend on disconnected agents, i.e., adding
or removing agents with no amount of work consumed or
performed does not change the scores of other agents.
Assumption 1. (Independence of Disconnected
Agents (IDA)) Accounting mechanism M satisfies in-
dependence of disconnected agents if, for any subjective
work graph Gi = (Vi, Ei, wi) and any choice set Ci, for any
k ∈ Vi for which there does not exist an edge in Ei or for
which all edges in Ei have zero weight, where G
′
i denotes
the graph where node k has been removed, the following
holds:
∀j ∈ V ′i : SMj (Gi, Ci) = SMj (G′i, C′i).
The next assumption requires that a priori, the accounting
mechanism does not put more or less trust into any agent,
i.e., we only consider mechanisms that, for any renaming of
the agents in the network, return the same scores.
Assumption 2. (Anonymity (ANON)) Accounting
mechanism M satisfies anonymity if for any subjective work
graph Gi = (Vi, Ei, wi) and choice set Ci, and graph isomor-
phism f such that G′i = f(Gi), C
′
i = f(Ci) and f(i) = i:
∀j ∈ Vi \ {i} : SMj (Gi, Ci) = SMf(j)(G′i, C′i).
Once the accounting mechanism has computed a score for
each agent in the choice set, an agent uses its allocation pol-
icy to decide to whom to allocate work to (see Figure 2).
Intuitively, we would expect that under any reasonable al-
location policy the probability of an agent being allocated
weakly increases if its score increases. Many different allo-
cation policies are conceivable, including proportional allo-
cation policies or threshold-based policies (see [19] for an
experimental comparison of different allocation policies). To
simplify the exposition, we will focus on the winner-take-all
policy throughout this paper and also use it to prove our
positive theoretical results.
Figure 2: Accounting Mechanism and Allocation
Policy.
Assumption 3. (Winner-Take-All (WTA) Alloca-
tion Policy) Given Gi, choice set Ci, and accounting scores
SMj (Gi, Ci) for each agent j ∈ Ci, the winner-take-all allo-
cation policy (WTA) selects the agent with the highest score,
i.e., A(SM (Gi, Ci)) = arg maxk∈Ci S
M
k (Gi, Ci), breaking
ties at random, to receive one unit of work from i.
Note that using the winner-take-all allocation policy,
agents give preferential treatment to agents that have a high
score. Thus, after a while, free-riders will not receive work
anymore and have an incentive to perform work.
3. THE DROP-EDGE MECHANISM
We now present the first example of an actual accounting
mechanism, adopted from [21]:
Definition 6. (Drop-Edge Mechanism) Given sub-
jective work graph Gi and choice set Ci, construct the mod-
ified graph GDi = (Vi, Ei, w
D
i ) with the w
D
i defined as:
∀(j, k)|i ∈ {j, k} : wDi (j, k) = wii(j, k)
∀(j, k)|j, k ∈ Ci : wDi (j, k) = 0 (1)
∀(j, k)|j ∈ Ci, k 6∈ Ci : wDi (j, k) = wki (j, k) (2)
∀(j, k)|k ∈ Ci, j 6∈ Ci : wDi (j, k) = wji (j, k) (3)
∀(j, k)|j, k /∈ Ci, i /∈{j, k} :wDi (j, k)=max{wji (j, k), wki (j, k)}.
Missing reports in the max-operator are set to 0. Agent
j’s score is SDj (Gi, Ci) = MFGDi
(j, i) −MFGDi (i, j), where
MFGDi
(j, i) denotes the maximum flow from j to i in GDi .
Lines (1)-(3) implement the simple “edge-dropping” idea.
Any reports received by agent i from agents in the choice
set Ci are dropped in determining edge weights in modified
graph GDi . An edge (j, k) is dropped completely if both j
and k are inside Ci. See Figure 3 for an illustration.
It is easy to verify that Drop-Edge satisfies IDA (because
max-flow is not affected when disconnected agents are re-
moved) as well as ANON (because max-flow is anonymous).
Proposition 1. The Drop-Edge mechanism satisfies
IDA and ANON.
3.1 Transitive Trust
Now we want to know what notion of transitive trust the
Drop-Edge mechanism provides. It turns out that Drop-
Edge satisfies a very strong notion of transitive trust: once
you trust agent j, you also trust all agents you are “referred”
to by j.
Definition 7. (Strong Transitive Trust) Accounting
mechanism M satisfies strong transitive trust if, for every
subjective work graph Gi = (Vi, Ei, wi), there exists a j ∈ Vi,
an amount of work Wj and an amount of work Wk, such that
for any set of new nodes K = {k1, ..., kn} added to Gi such
that G′i = (V
′
i , Ei, wi) with V
′
i = Vi ∪K, and
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Figure 3: An illustration of the Drop-Edge mechanism from i’s perspective. The choice set is Ci = {k,m}. (a)
Agent i’s subjective work graph where each edge has two weights, one from each agent who knows about
that edge. (b) Agent i’s subjective work graph after the Drop-Edge mechanism has been applied.
• if j performs Wj units of work for i, and
• each k ∈ K performs Wk units of work for j, and
• j makes a truthful report about the work received from
each k ∈ K, leading to G′′i ,
then for every choice set Ckl that contains kl but nei-
ther j nor any of the other agents from K, it holds that:
A(SM (G′′i , Ck1)) = k1 and after k1 consumes 1 unit of work
from i leading to G′′′i it holds that A(S
M (G′′′i , Ck2)) = k2,
etc., and after kn−1 consumes 1 unit of work from i leading
to Gn+1i , it holds that A(S
M (Gn+1i , Ckn)) = kn.
Proposition 2. The Drop-Edge mechanism together
with WTA satisfies strong transitive trust.
Proof. Given graph Gi = (Vi, Ei, wi), take any j ∈ Vi
and let Wj = Wk = Smax + 1 where Smax is the maximum
score any l ∈ Vi could get for any choice set Ci. We add a set
of agents K to Gi, which does not change the scores (IDA).
Now j performs Wj units of work for i and each k ∈ K
performsWk units of work for j, and j reports this truthfully,
leading to G′i. Using Drop-Edge, the scores for each k ∈
K given choice set Ck are: S
D
k (G
′
i, Ck) = MFG′Di
(k, i) −
MFG′Di
(i, k) = Smax + 1. Thus, given choice set Ck1 and
using the WTA allocation policy, agent k1 receives 1 unit
of work from i. This changes the flow between k1 and i,
but does not affect any other agent in K. Thus, we can
continue this process for all n agents, each receiving 1 unit
of work.
3.2 Misreport-Proofness
Ideally, accounting mechanisms should be robust against
strategic manipulations. Otherwise, agents may try to ma-
nipulate the mechanism to gain an advantage, which can
lead to suboptimal allocations of resources and reduce over-
all efficiency. The first class of manipulations we consider are
misreports, where an agent reports false information about
its work performed or consumed. In words, a mechanism is
misreport-proof if reporting false work information can only
worsen an agent’s own score or improve the score of other
agents.
Definition 8. (Long-term Misreport-proof)2 An ac-
counting mechanism M satisfies long-term misreport-
proofness if, for any subjective work graph Gi, any choice set
Ci, any agent j ∈ Ci, for every misreport manipulation mj
2Note that we extend the definition of misreport-proofness
from [21] to long-term misreport-proofness because sybil at-
tacks require a more dynamic analysis.
by j, and any set of interactions I by all agents that comes
after the misreport manipulation, such that G′′i = Gi ↓mj ↓I,
and G′i = Gi ↓I, the following holds:
• SMj (G′′i , Ci) ≤ SMj (G′i, Ci), and
• SMk (G′′i , Ci) ≥ SMk (G′i, Ci) ∀k ∈ Ci \ {j}.
Note that the definition of long-term misreport-proofness
does not rule out that the choice set changes over time. We
only compare the scores (and use the choice set) at one point
in time, namely after the manipulation and all interactions
are over.
Proposition 3. The Drop-Edge mechanism is long-term
misreport-proof.
Proof. In [21], we have already shown that using Drop-
Edge, j’s reports have no direct impact on its own or other
agents’ scores from i’s perspective whenever j is in i’s choice
set. Furthermore, j only has an indirect impact on another
agent k in situations where k is inside someone’s choice set
and j is not. In that situation, j’s report may make a dif-
ference in the allocation decision. However, given the same
set of interactions I, neither its own nor other agents’ scores
change when it would matter for j, which shows long-term
misreport-proofness.
3.3 Sybil Attacks
The second class of manipulations we consider are sybil
manipulations, where an agent introduces sybils (fake
agents) into the network to manipulate the accounting mech-
anism. Given subjective work graph Gi, an attacking agent
can do multiple things, e.g., add sybils to the network, or
make multiple false reports. We model this as happening in
one step, inducing a new graph G′i. Note that it is irrele-
vant how an attacker creates sybils. In our model and for
our analysis, the only thing that matters is how the attack
affects the subjective work graph.
Definition 9. (Sybil Attack) A sybil attack by agent j
is a tuple σj = (Vs, Es, ws) where Vs = {sj1 , sj2 , ...} is a set
of sybils, Es = {(x, y) : x, y ∈ S ∪ {j}}, and ws are the edge
weights for the edges in Es (one weight per edge). Applying
the sybil attack σj to agent i’s subjective work graph Gi =
(Vi, Ei, wi) results in a modified graph Gi ↓σj = G′i = (Vi ∪
Vs, Ei ∪Es, w′) where w′(e) = wi(e) for e ∈ Ei and w′(e) =
ws(e) for e ∈ Es.
We now present an example that illustrates how vulnerable
the Drop-Edge mechanism is to sybil attacks, before we turn
to the theoretical analysis in the next section.
Figure 4: A sybil attack on Drop-Edge.
Example 1. Consider Figure 4 where we present a sybil
attack on the Drop-Edge mechanism. Agent j has already
performed/consumed 10 units of work for/from agent i, and
we assume that i now trusts j’s reports about other agents
to some degree. Now, j creates 3 sybils and falsely reports
to i that these sybils have performed 10 units of work for j.
Assuming that this raises the sybils’ scores high enough, the
sybils can exploit their scores and consume work from i.
4. THEORETICAL ANALYSIS
In this section, we analyze whether other accounting
mechanisms are more robust against sybil attacks than
Drop-Edge or whether this vulnerability is unavoidable. For
this analysis, we distinguish between weakly beneficial sybil
attacks and strongly beneficial attacks. Note that the follow-
ing definitions are purposefully written to be agnostic to the
behavior of other agents in the network. Our theoretical re-
sults hold without requiring specific assumptions about their
behaviors. We consider a sybil attack to be (weakly) bene-
ficial if as a result of the manipulation, the attacking agent
or one of its sybils receives some work when it previously
didn’t, without a negative effect on the attacking agent:
Definition 10. ((Weakly) Beneficial Sybil Attack)
Given accounting mechanism M , subjective work graph Gi,
and choice set Ci such that A(S
M (Gi, Ci)) = k, a (weakly)
beneficial sybil attack σj by agent j 6= k ∈ Vi such that
Gi ↓σj = G′i and Ci ↓σj = C′i, is one where at least one of
(1), (2), or (3), or combinations thereof holds:
(1) j’s score is increased so that A(SM (G′i, C
′
i)) = j.
(2) other agents’ scores are lowered so that A(SM (G′i, C
′
i)) = j.
(3) sybil s is created with a score so that A(SM (G′i, C
′
i)) = s,
whereby j’s score is not decreased.
Note that our definition of a sybil attack assumes that the
sybil attack itself does not involve performing any work for
other agents; the sybil attack only creates sybils and fake
edges. However, it may be necessary for an attacker to first
perform some work, to bring itself into a position where a
sybil attack is beneficial. How beneficial an attack really
is depends on the trade-off between the amount of work
performed and the amount of work consumed:
Definition 11. (Strongly Beneficial Sybil Attacks)
Given accounting mechanism M and work graph Gi =
(Vi, Ei, wi), assume agent j ∈ Vi performs ωj units of work
for agents in Vi to increase its score, leading to G
′
i. Then
j performs a sybil attack σj such that G
′′
i = G
′
i ↓ σj. Let
(ωj , σj)
n denote an n−times-repetition of this process, i.e.,
of performing some work and performing the sybil attack.
Let ωn−(σj) > 0 denote the amount of work involved in per-
forming the n-times repetition of this process, and let ωn+(σj)
denote the amount of work that agent j or any of its sybils
will be able to consume as a result of the process. We call σj
a strongly beneficial sybil attack if: limn→∞
ωn+(σj
ωn−(σj
=∞.
Note that the sybil attack presented in Figure 4 was actually
strongly beneficial. Agent j could continue generating new
sybils that can then consume work for free. We will now show
that this is not unique to Drop-Edge, but that in fact all
mechanisms that are long-term misreport-proof and satisfy
strong transitive trust are this vulnerable to sybil attacks.
The intuition for this is simple: because of strong transitive
trust, an agent can create an infinite number of sybils that
inherit some of the trust that other against have placed in
j, and because of the misreport-proofness property, agent j
cannot be penalized for making false reports about its sybils.
Theorem 1. Every accounting mechanism that satisfies
IDA, ANON, long-term misreport-proofness, and strong
transitive trust, is vulnerable to strongly beneficial sybil at-
tacks.
Proof. Assume that accounting mechanism M satisfies
the strong transitive trust property, and take any subjective
work graph Gi with nodes j and K = {k1, . . . , kn} as de-
scribed in Definition 7. Let Wj and Wk be the corresponding
values, such that j performs Wj units of work for i, and all
agents k ∈ K perform Wk units of work for j. Because M
is long-term misreport-proof, j is best off making a truth-
ful report regarding the work received, leading to G′i such
that now A(SM (G′i, Ck1)) = k1 etc., as described in Defini-
tion 7. Now, assume that agent j creates n sybils s1, . . . , sn,
which are added to the graph, leading to G′′i . Because of
the independence of disconnected agents (Assumption 1),
this does not change any of the scores and thus, the result
of the allocation policy also does not change. Because M
is anonymous (Assumption 2), we can apply a graph iso-
morphism f to G′′i that only switches the labels of all nodes
k1, . . . , kn with s1, . . . , sn, leading toG
′′′
i and C
′
s1 . Thus, now
A(SM (G′′′i , C
′
s1)) = s1, and after sybil s1 consumes 1 unit of
work from i, it holds that A(SM (G′′′′i , C
′′
s2)) = s2, and so on.
Thus, property (3) of Definition 10 is satisfied. Of course, j
can also directly perform a sybil attack σj , adding n agents
to the graph and reporting that all of them have performed
Wk units of work for j, with the same outcome. Note that the
work to perform this sybil attack is fixed at ωn−(σj) = Wj ,
which, in particular, is independent of n. As we increase the
number of sybils n, each additional sybil receives at least
one unit of work from i. Thus, limn→∞
ωn+(σj)
ωn−(σj)
=∞.
We see that the strong transitive trust property asks too
much. For this reason we introduce weak transitive trust,
where now agent j can only transfer its trust from i to one
other agent k, instead of to an infinite number of agents:
Definition 12. (Weak Transitive Trust) Accounting
mechanism M satisfies weak transitive trust if, for every sub-
jective work graph Gi = (Vi, Ei, wi), there exists a j ∈ Vi,
after adding node k to Gi this leads to G
′
i = (V
′
i , Ei, wi)
with V ′i = Vi ∪ {k}, and there exists an amount of work Wj
and Wk, such that if j performs Wj units of work for i, and
k performs Wk units of work for j, and j makes a truthful
report about the work received from k, leading to G′′i , then
for every choice set Ck that contains k but not j, it holds
that: A(SM (G′′i , Ck)) = k.
We now show that we have actually gained something by
relaxing strong transitive trust to weak transitive trust: we
can now construct accounting mechanisms that are robust
against strongly beneficial sybil attacks.
Definition 13 (Drop-Edge-Variant-1). Given sub-
jective work graph Gi = (Vi, Ei, wi) and choice set Ci, con-
struct the modified graph GDi with weights w
D
i as defined for
Drop-Edge. Additionally, we temporarily create trust scores
ti(j, k) for each edge (j, k), which are initialized to zero, and
then updated in the following way:
1. For each unit of work received from agent j: ti(j, i)++;
2. For each unit of work performed for agent j by i:
(a) Compute the max-flow from j to i based on GDi .
(b) For each of i’s incoming edges (k, i) that are part
of this max-flow with flow(k, i) > 0: ti(k, i)- -;
3. To compute agent j’s score, temporarily construct a
new graph GD1i based on G
D
i with:
(a) for all edges (k, i) with k 6= j : wD1i (k, i) = ti(k, i)
(b) for all other edges (x, y) : wD1i (x, y) = w
D
i (x, y).
j’s score is SD1j (G
D1
i , Ci) = MFGD1i
(j, i)−MFGD1i (i, j).
Theorem 2. The Drop-Edge-Variant-1 accounting
mechanism together with allocation policy WTA satisfies
IDA, ANON, long-term misreport-proofness, and weak
transitive trust, and is robust against strongly-beneficial
sybil attacks.
Proof. First, the mechanism satisfies IDA because the
max-flow between two nodes is not affected when discon-
nected agents are removed from the graph. Second, the
mechanism satisfies ANON because max-flow is anony-
mous. Third, the mechanism inherits long-term misreport-
proofness from Drop-Edge. When i computes the score for
j, then the additional trust-score operations and the con-
struction of GD1i only affect the underlying work weights on
edges (k, i) with k 6= j. Thus, no report by j is ever used to
change the underlying work weights when it matters for j,
which is needed for long-term misreport-proofness.
Fourth, the mechanism satisfies the weak transitive trust
property, because Drop-Edge satisfies strong transitive trust
(see Proposition 2) and in Drop-Edge-Variant-1, the trust
scores are initialized to be 0. In particular, a completely new
node j that has never reported anything is unaffected by the
additional trust score computations. Thus, j can perform
enough units of work for i to gain i’s trust and then make
a positive report about some new node k to i, such that k
will at least receive one unit of work from i.
Fifth, the mechanism is robust against strongly beneficial
sybil attacks because of its use of the trust scores. The trust
scores ti(j, i) are used to make sure that i does not perform
too many units of work for other agents k because of positive
reports from j about k.3 Every time one unit of work is
performed (or received), the trust score ti(j, i) is increased
or decreased appropriately. Thus, no matter how much work
Wj agent j initially performed for i, if j tries to exploit i via
a sybil attack, then at some point i’s trust in j will be “used
up,” and from then on, agent i will not perform any more
work for other agents k based on reports by j, which rules
out strongly beneficial sybil attacks.
3We know that our algorithm decreases the trust scores of
multiple edges in one round, while it could also compute the
relative weight of the edges in the max-flow and decrease the
trust scores accordingly (more slowly). However, this aspect
is not important for the theoretical result. For practical con-
siderations and a more sophisticated algorithm see [7].
Unfortunately, the relaxation from strong to weak transitive
trust does not rule out all kinds of sybil attacks:
Theorem 3. Every accounting mechanism that satisfies
IDA, ANON, long-term misreport-proofness, and weak tran-
sitive trust, is vulnerable to weakly beneficial sybil attacks.
Proof. The proof proceeds similarly as the proof of The-
orem 1. We consider any accounting mechanism M that sat-
isfies weak transitive trust, and take any subjective work
graph Gi with nodes j and k as described in Definition 12.
Let Wj and Wk be the corresponding values, such that j per-
forms Wj units of work for i, and k perform Wk units of work
for j. Because M is long-term misreport-proof, j is best off
making a truthful report regarding the work received, lead-
ing to G′i such that now A(S
M (G′i, Ck)) = k, as described
in Definition 12. Now, assume that agent j creates a sybil
agent s which is added to the graph, leading to G′′i . Because
of the independence of disconnected agents (Assumption 1),
this does not change any of the scores and thus, the result
of the allocation policy also does not change. Because M is
anonymous (Assumption 2), we can apply a graph isomor-
phism f to G′′i that only switches the labels of node k with s
leading to G′′′i and C
′
s. Thus, now A(S
M (G′′′i , C
′
s)) = s, i.e.,
sybil s can consumes 1 unit of work from i, and because of
long-term misreport-proofness, this does not have a negative
effect on j. Thus, property (3) of Definition 10 is satisfied.
Of course, j can also directly perform a sybil attack σj ,
adding sybil agent s to the graph and reporting that s has
performed Wk units of work for j, with the same outcome.
Thus, this constitutes a weakly beneficial sybil attack.
5. TIGHTNESS
What Theorem 3 tells us is that given the two assumptions
IDA and ANON, it is impossible to simultaneously satisfy
the three properties (1) long-term misreport-proofness, (2)
weak transitive trust, and (3) robustness against weakly ben-
eficial sybil attacks. In this section, we show that Theorem 3
is tight, in the sense that dropping any one of these three
properties leads to a positive result.
Proposition 4. There exists an accounting mechanism
that satisfies IDA, ANON, long-term misreport-proofness,
and weak transitive trust.
Proof. Consider the basic Drop-Edge mechanism pre-
sented in Section 3 together with WTA. By Proposition 1,
it satisfies IDA and ANON. By Proposition 2, it also satis-
fies the strong transitive trust property which implies that
it satisfies weak transitive trust. Finally, by Proposition 3,
it is also long-term misreport-proof. Note, however, that it
is vulnerable to strongly beneficial sybil attacks (Example
1), which is unavoidable by Theorem 1.
Proposition 5. There exists a mechanism that satisfies
IDA, ANON, and weak transitive trust, and is robust against
weakly beneficial sybil attacks.
Proof. We create a new mechanism, which we call Drop-
Edge-Variant-2, which works like the basic Drop-Edge mech-
anism as presented in Section 3, except:
• After any agent k consumes one unit of work from i,
we compute the max-flow from k to i, and for each
edge e = (j, i) that is part of this max-flow we set:
wD2i (j, i) = w
D2
i (j, i)− 1.
• j’s score is SD2j (GD2i , Ci)=MFGD2i (j, i)−MFGD2i (i, j).
Thus, Drop-Edge-Variant-2 is even more resolute than
Drop-Edge-Variant-1 in how it handles indirect effects: it
reduces the weight wD2i (j, i) on edge (j, i), even if j has not
consumed any new work from i, but just because j was in-
directly responsible for another agent k receiving work from
i, due to a positive report by j about k.
First, Drop-Edge-Variant-2 together with WTA satisfies
IDA (because removing disconnected agents has no influence
on the max-flow between two nodes), and ANON (because
max-flow is anonymous).
Second, to show weak transitive trust, consider any graph
Gi = (Vi, Ei, wi) and any j ∈ Vi, and let Wj = Smax + 1,
where Smax is the maximum score any l ∈ Vi could get
for any choice set Ci. Now, let j perform Wj units of work
for i, holding everything else constant (i.e., no other agent
including j is consuming anything). This increases j’s score
by Smax + 1. Now, consider a new agent k which performs
Wk = Wj units of work for j. If j reports this truthfully to
agent i, then k’s score from i’s perspective is now at least
Smax + 1. Thus, given allocation policy WTA, agent k can
now consume at least one unit of work from i, which shows
that the weak transitive trust property is satisfied.
Finally, consider agent j trying to perform a sybil at-
tack. By creating new sybil nodes with edges between those
sybils and j, none of the max-flows between existing agents
and agent i are affected, and thus conditions (1) and (2) of
Definition 10 do not apply. But most importantly, if agent
j now makes a positive report to agent i about work re-
ceived from one of its sybils s, and if as a consequence
A(SD2(G′i, C
′
i)) = s, then sybil node s may receive one unit
of work from i, but in turn, agent j’s score is also lowered by
one unit, according to the definition of Drop-Edge-Variant-
2. Thus, condition (3) of Definition 10 is also not satisfied,
which shows that the mechanism is robust against weakly
beneficial sybil attacks. However, note that this comes at
the cost of not being long-term misreport-proof.
Proposition 6. There exists an accounting mechanism
that satisfies IDA, ANON, long-term misreport-proofness,
and is robust against weakly beneficial sybil attacks.
Proof. Consider an accounting mechanism that always
returns the same score (e.g., 0) for all agents. Obviously, this
mechanism satisfies IDA and ANON, is long-term misreport-
proof as well as robust against weakly beneficial sybil at-
tacks, because the agents’ reports have no influence on the
scores. However, note that the mechanism does not even
satisfy the weak transitive trust property.
6. DISCUSSION AND RELATEDWORK
In this section, we contrast our results with other ap-
proaches and survey some related work. First, if binding
contracts or atomic transactions were available, then real
currencies, micro payment systems, or electronic currencies
like BitCoin [16] could be used. These would be sybil-proof
because I would need to transfer some currency to my sybils
to enable them to consume work, which is not advantageous.
Locally-valid currencies like iOwe [11] could be implemented
in our domain. However, while iOwe is sybil-proof, it does
not provide transitive trust.
An emerging literature on credit networks (e.g.,[15, 22, 13,
6]) considers similar challenges as we do. However, these pa-
pers assume pre-existing trust networks, and they also do
not have a real notion of transitive trust. In our model, af-
ter agent A has performed work for B, agent B is willing
to report this to the system given a misreport-proof mech-
anism. However, agent B is not personally vouching for A,
or taking a risk on behalf of A. In contrast, in credit net-
works, a trust link between A and B means that agent B is
willing to pay agent C (in IOUs) for work that A consumes
from C, trusting that A will repay B in the future. This
explains why credit networks are sybil-proof. If I created a
sybil and vouched for it, then I would have to pay for the
work that my sybil consumes, which is not beneficial. This
shows that credit networks are an interesting way to lever-
age an underlying social network. Similarly, SybilGuard [23]
also leverages an underlying social network, but not as a ba-
sis for a credit network, but instead to automatically bound
the number of effective sybil identities that can be created.
The work on transitive trust and reputation mechanisms
[10, 1] is an important precursor to our work. Cheng et
al. [2, 3] have studied the sybil-proofness of reputation mech-
anisms. While this work influenced our thinking about sybil-
proofness, unfortunately, their results do not translate to our
domain. In distributed work systems, every positive report
by A about his interaction with B, i.e., B performed work
for A, is simultaneously a negative report about A, i.e., A re-
ceived work from B. This fundamental tension is not present
in reputation mechanisms. Resnick and Sami [18] also study
the sybil-proofness problem. However, in their model, when
two agents interact, the principal agent observes whether
the outcome (due to the other agent’s action) is positive or
negative. Thus, a defector can immediately be identified, in
contrast to our setting.
One of the largest steps forward regarding robust incen-
tives in real-world multi-agent systems was the BitTorrent
protocol [4]. However, BitTorrent only promotes bilateral
transactions and does not satisfy transitive trust. Feldman
et al. [8, 9] identify numerous challenges involved in provid-
ing robust incentives in fully decentralized P2P networks.
Piatek et al. [17] find empirically that most users of P2P
file-sharing networks are connected via a one hop link and
motivate the use of well-connected intermediaries to bro-
ker information, enabling transitivity. Along similar lines,
Meulpolder et al. [14] present a fully decentralized mecha-
nism, but without a formal analysis of its properties.
Note that none of the prior literature on sybil attacks,
including a survey by Levine et al. [12] on “Solutions to the
Sybil Attack,” had previously made the connection between
sybil-proofness and transitive trust. Thus, our work provides
new insights regarding the difficulties involved in achieving
sybil-proofness that were previously not known.
7. CONCLUSION
In this paper, we have studied the design of sybil-proof ac-
counting mechanisms with transitive trust. Our domain is a
distributed work system in which all transactions are private
and bilateral, transactions cannot be bound to payments or
reports, and there are no pre-existing trust links. The mech-
anisms we study can be used in the context of many multi-
agent-system applications. For example, our approach is ap-
plicable to P2P file-sharing networks, ride-sharing systems,
and ad-hoc wireless routing networks.
Our main results illustrate an interesting trade-off be-
tween different notions of transitive trust on the one side
and different levels of robustness against sybil attacks on
the other side. We have shown that it is impossible to si-
multaneously require the strongest form of transitive trust
while also requiring robustness against strongly beneficial
sybil attacks. However, we have also demonstrated that it is
possible to strike a balance, by designing mechanisms that
provide a weaker form of transitive trust while being robust
against strongly beneficial sybil attacks.
The particular mechanism we have presented only serves
as a proof-of-concept, but further refinements are necessary
to adapt the mechanism for use in practice. For future re-
search, we are considering an experimental evaluation of this
approach, comparing the effects of strong vs. weak transitive
trust on overall efficiency. Delaviz et al. [7] have indepen-
dently developed a mechanism that is similar to ours, and
they have already provided some experimental results sug-
gesting that the general approach may be useful in practice.
Our impossibility results also illustrate the usefulness of
social ties for providing robustness against sybils. In domains
with existing trust relationships, e.g., based on social net-
works, a different form of transitive trust can be enabled,
while providing robustness to sybil attacks. Liu et al. [13]
have shown, that even using just a limited amount of direct
trust, high efficiency gains can be realized. However, in many
domains it is unrealistic to assume pre-existing trust rela-
tions, which limits the applicability of such approaches. We
have shown what notions of sybil-proofness can be achieved,
even in domains where no pre-existing trust relations exist.
This significantly broadens the applicability of our mech-
anisms compared to mechanisms that require pre-existing
trust. By showing which properties of accounting mecha-
nisms are inherently incompatible, future research can focus
on the optimal trade-off between those properties.
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